

The final and definitive version of this paper will be published in the *Philosophical Quarterly*.

THE SCOPE OF RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

John Brunero

Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are Narrow-Scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are Wide-Scope requirements. I present a new objection to the Narrow-Scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements Kolodny considers. And I show how his argument for the Narrow-Scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption: roughly, that an attitude which puts in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement somewhere, puts in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement everywhere. I also show how my argument against Kolodny is analogous to arguments presented by defenders of Moral Particularism who appeal to Holism about Reasons.

The requirements of rationality specify conflicts concerning our attitudes that we should resolve (or avoid if we do not yet have them) if we are to be rational. Sometimes these conflicts involve the presence of two (or more) conflicting attitudes. For instance, we are rationally required to resolve the conflicts between our inconsistent beliefs and the conflicts between our inconsistent intentions. Other times these conflicts involve the presence of some attitude(s) and the absence of another. For instance, we are rationally required to resolve the conflict between our intending an end and *not* intending the means believed necessary to carry out that end. And we are rationally required to resolve the conflict between our believing p , $p \rightarrow q$, and *not* believing q . To cover all such cases, we'll say that the requirements of rationality specify *conflicts among attitude-states* that we should resolve (or avoid if we do not yet have them) if we are to be rational. An attitude-state could consist in either the presence or absence of an attitude.

Philosophers who accept this characterization of rational requirements, or something close to it, disagree about the logical structure of rational requirements. Many

have thought that all rational requirements are Wide-Scope requirements.¹ Wide-Scope requirements, roughly speaking, are requirements you can comply with by revising any one of the relevant conflicting attitude-states. For instance, suppose you believe p , $p \rightarrow q$, but do not believe q . If, as many think, there is a Wide-Scope requirement governing this conflict -- it might read, 'you rationally ought (if you believe p and believe $p \rightarrow q$, then believe q)' -- then one could comply with it *either* by dropping one's belief that p , *or* by dropping one's belief that $p \rightarrow q$, *or* by coming to believe q . 'Rationally ought' has logical scope over the entire conditional, not merely over the attitude-state mentioned in the consequent. (Of course, this entire conditional could appear as the consequent of *another* conditional. But that doesn't change the fact that *this* conditional is Wide-Scope.)

Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that not all rational requirements are Wide-Scope requirements; some are Narrow-Scope requirements.² Narrow-Scope requirements, roughly speaking, are requirements you can comply with only by revising *some specific* attitude-state. Niko Kolodny has argued that the following four rational requirements are Narrow-Scope:

(I+): Rationality requires one to intend to X, if one believes that there is conclusive reason to X.

(B+): Rationality requires one to believe that p , if one believes that there is conclusive evidence that p .

¹ The Wide-Scope interpretation of rational requirements has recently been defended in J. Broome, 'Normative Requirements', in Jonathan Dancy (ed.), *Normativity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 78-99, and J. Broome, 'Wide or Narrow Scope?', *Mind*, 116 (2007), pp. 359-370, as well as in J. Dancy, *Practical Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 70-76, and R. J. Wallace, 'Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason', *Philosopher's Imprint*, 1 (2001), pp. 1-26. For earlier presentations and defenses of this view, see S. Darwall, *Impartial Reason* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), P. S. Greenspan, 'Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives', *Journal of Philosophy*, 72 (1975), pp. 259-276, and T. Hill, 'The Hypothetical Imperative', *Philosophical Review*, 82 (1973), pp. 429-450.

² See M. Schroeder, 'The Scope of Instrumental Reason', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 18 (2004), pp. 337-364, and N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', *Mind*, 114 (2005), pp. 509-563.

(I-): Rationality requires one not to intend to X, if one believes that one lacks sufficient reason to X.

(B-): Rationality requires one not to believe that p , if one believes that there is not sufficient evidence that p .³

Kolodny argues that someone who has the conflicting attitude-states governed by these four requirements can come to comply with the relevant requirement only by revising the first attitude-state mentioned in each requirement above. For instance, someone who believes that there is conclusive reason to X but does not intend to X can comply with (I+) only by coming to intend to X. Hence (I+) should be understood as a Narrow-Scope requirement; 'requires' does not have logical scope over the entire conditional, but merely over the attitude-state mentioned in the consequent.

Kolodny argues that these four requirements are Narrow-Scope requirements in the course of an argument for the thesis that there are no reasons to comply with the requirements of rationality in general -- a thesis for which he gives two other independent, convincing arguments. I agree with Kolodny's thesis that there is no reason to comply with the requirements of rationality in general, though I'll say nothing about it here. Rather, I'll object to his claim -- which is also challenged by John Broome -- that there are Narrow-Scope rational requirements.⁴ (More precisely, Kolodny's claim, to which I object, is that there are *local* Narrow-Scope rational requirements. I am willing to concede the existence of *global* Narrow-Scope rational requirements. The local-global distinction is explained in §1 below and again discussed in §3.)

³ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at p. 521.

⁴ J. Broome, 'Wide or Narrow Scope?', *Mind*, 116 (2007), pp. 359-370.

While Kolodny has done much to dispel traditional worries about the existence of Narrow-Scope rational requirements (as I explain in §1 below), I will present a new objection (§2) against the Narrow-Scope interpretations of these four rational requirements, and I'll discuss (§3) how this objection is related to a view advanced by Moral Particularists in ethical theory. In light of this discussion, I present a diagnosis (§4) of where I think Kolodny's *argument* for the Narrow-Scope interpretations of these four rational requirements has gone astray.

§1.

Attraction to the Wide-Scope interpretation of rational requirements is often motivated by worries about detachment analogous to those that emerge with the interpretation of certain conditionals in alethic modal logic. We might be tempted to read a conditional like 'If it rains all September, it's bound to rain on Taft's birthday' quite literally as having the logical form $p \rightarrow \Box q$, where p is 'It rains all September' and q is 'It rains on Taft's birthday' and ' \rightarrow ' is the material conditional. But such a reading is problematic in that it allows us to infer, using *modus ponens*, from 'It rains all September' that 'It is necessary that it rains on Taft's birthday.' But, of course, that it rains on Taft's birthday is a contingent truth, not a necessary one. So, instead, we should read the conditional as having the logical form $\Box(p \rightarrow q)$; necessarily, if it rains all September, it rains on Taft's birthday.⁵ This reading of the conditional does not license detachment: we cannot infer the obviously false claim -- that it is necessary that it rains on Taft's birthday -- from p and $\Box(p \rightarrow q)$.

⁵ See G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell, *A New Introduction to Modal Logic* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 14-16. This is logically equivalent to $\sim \Diamond(p \& \sim q)$: it is not possible that it rains all September and does not rain on Taft's birthday.

A similar ambiguity, it is sometimes thought, arises with conditionals specifying rational requirements.⁶ Suppose you intend to steal money from someone's house, believe that a necessary means of doing so is breaking in at night, but do not intend to break in at night. Someone might express the requirement of instrumental rationality you are violating as follows: 'If you intend to steal the money, you ought to intend to break in at night.' If we read this claim quite literally, it will have a Narrow-Scope logical form, $p \rightarrow Oq$ (where p is 'You intend to steal the money' q is 'You intend to break in at night' and 'O' is read as 'you ought to see to it that...' and ' \rightarrow ' again as the material conditional).⁷ On this interpretation, from 'You intend to steal the money' we can infer, using *modus ponens*, that 'You ought to see to it that you intend to break in at night.' But, of course, intending to break in at night is *not* what you ought to see to -- there are very good moral and prudential reasons not to do this (it's wrong to break into other people's homes, you'll probably get caught and face harsh penalties, etc.) and there's not much, if anything, to be said in favor of doing this. So, instead, we should read that statement as having the logical form $O(p \rightarrow q)$; you ought to see to it that if you intend to steal the money, you intend to break in at night.⁸ This is logically equivalent to $\sim P(p \& \sim q)$: it is not permissible that you both intend to steal the money and not intend to break in at night. That combination of attitude-states is prohibited.

The consequent detached from the Narrow-Scope requirement above ('You ought to see to it that you intend to break in at night.') is clearly false when we take the 'ought' to be the ordinary practical ought -- the 'ought' which specifies what is supported by the

⁶ J. Broome, 'Normative Requirements', pp. 78-99.

⁷ The grammatically awkward formulation 'you ought to see to it that' comes from J. Broome, 'Normative Requirements', at pp. 79. For a challenge to the idea that oughts take propositions in this way, see M. Schroeder, 'The Scope of Instrumental Reason'.

⁸ This view is defended in J. Broome, 'Normative Requirements'.

balance of reasons. On this understanding of 'ought', it's not the case that you ought to see to it that you intend to break in at night; again, there are very good moral and prudential reasons not to do this. But we could specify that the 'ought' is a different kind of ought -- a 'rational ought' which is such the facts about whether one ought (or ought not) to X according to the balance of reasons do not entail anything about whether one *rationally ought* (or ought not) to X. (Suppose someone falsely believes that he has good reason to break in at night. Here we could say that though he has no reason at all to intend to break in at night, he rationally ought to intend to do so.)⁹ On this new understanding of 'ought' the consequent detached from the Narrow-Scope requirement above need not strike us as clearly false. And we could reformulate the language to clearly indicate that we are not speaking of the ordinary practical ought by saying instead something like 'You rationally ought to intend to break in at night' or, as Kolodny prefers, 'Rationality requires you to intend to break in at night.' Now the detached consequent need not strike us as obviously false since it is clearly distinguished from the ordinary practical ought.¹⁰

But even once we draw this distinction, detachment could still prove troublesome.

Consider (I+) above. We could read this as a Wide-Scope requirement:

(I+WS): Rationality requires one (either not to believe that one has
conclusive reason to X, or to intend to X);

⁹ The 'rational ought' here is also sometimes called the 'subjective ought.' For further discussion, see D. Parfit, 'Reason and Motivation', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol.*, 77 (1997), pp. 93-130, at p.93, D. Parfit *Climbing the Mountain* (forthcoming), Ch. 1, §1, and M. Schroeder 'Means-Ends Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons' *Philosophical Studies* (forthcoming).

¹⁰ It's also worth noting that recent arguments in both J. Raz, 'The Myth of Instrumental Rationality', *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 1 (2005), pp. 2-28, and K. Setiya 'Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason', *Ethics*, 117 (2007), pp 649-673, show that implausible consequences follow from the view -- which was once but is no longer held by John Broome -- that the 'O' in the *Wide-Scope* interpretation of a rational requirement is the ordinary practical ought.

or as a Narrow-Scope requirement:

(I+NS): If one believes that one has conclusive reason to X, then rationality requires one to intend to X.

Similarly, we could interpret (I-) as a Wide-Scope requirement:

(I-WS): Rationality requires one (either not to believe that one lacks sufficient reason to X, or not to intend to X),

or as a Narrow-Scope requirement:

(I-NS): If one believes that one lacks sufficient reason to X, then rationality requires that one not intend to X.¹¹

Let's suppose we employ the Narrow-Scope interpretations of both (I+) and (I-) and let's suppose that you believe, inconsistently, both that you have conclusive reason to X and that you lack sufficient reason to X. From (I+NS) and (I-NS), it follows that rationality requires that you intend to X and rationality requires that you not intend to X. But you cannot comply with both of these claims about what rationality requires; you'll either violate (I+NS) or violate (I-NS). On the Wide-Scope interpretations of (I+) and (I-), in contrast, you can comply with both claims about what rationality requires. According to (I+WS) and (I-WS), rationality requires you to *either* not believe you have conclusive reason to X *or* intend to X, and rationality requires you to *either* not believe you have insufficient reason to X *or* not intend to X. And you could comply with both of these claims about what rationality requires (by, for instance, abandoning your belief that you

¹¹ (B+), likewise, can be read as (B+WS): Rationality requires one (either not to believe that one has conclusive evidence that *p*, or to believe that *p*); or as (B+NS): If one believes that there is conclusive evidence that *p*, rationality requires one to believe that *p*. And (B-) can be read as (B-WS): Rationality requires one (either not to believe that there is not sufficient evidence that *p* or not to believe that *p*); or as (B-NS): If one believes there is not sufficient evidence that *p*, then rationality requires one not to believe that *p*.

have insufficient reason to X and intending to X). It's not the case that whatever you do, you'll violate some rational requirement.

Kolodny, however, does not see the possibility of such conflicts among rational requirements as an objection to the Narrow-Scope interpretations of (I+) and (I-). In his view, in believing both that you have conclusive reason to X and that you have insufficient reason to X, you have, as he puts it, painted yourself into a corner: you've made it such that there's nothing you can do without violating some rational requirement. And, so the fact that this is precisely what's entailed by (I+NS) and (I-NS) in this case is no objection. Indeed, he argues, the two detached claims about what rationality requires reflect the 'competing normative pressures' you feel in this situation given your beliefs: you feel some normative pressure to intend to X and some normative pressure not to intend to X.¹²

Also, it's important to keep in mind that Kolodny is concerned to specify 'local' requirements of rationality, not 'global' requirements of rationality.¹³ Local requirements of rationality specify what rationality requires of us in light of some *specific conflict of attitude-states*, while global requirements of rationality specify what rationality requires of us in light of our *entire set* of attitude-states. Global requirements, we might say, tell us what rationality requires of us *all-attitudes-states-considered*. (I+NS) and (I-NS) give expression to the competing 'local' normative pressures put in place by *specific attitude-states*: a belief that one has conclusive reason to X puts in place normative pressure to intend to X and a belief that one has insufficient reason to X puts in place normative pressure not to intend to X.

¹² N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at p. 529fn. See also N. Kolodny, 'State or Process Requirements?', *Mind*, 116 (2007), pp. 371-385, at pp. 382-383.

¹³ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at p. 516.

The distinction between local and global requirements parallels a distinction often made by moral philosophers, following David Ross, between *prima facie* obligations and all-things-considered obligations.¹⁴ Just as local rational requirements specify what one is rationally required to do in light of some specific attitude-state, *prima facie* obligations specify what one is obligated to do in light of some specific feature of one's situation (such as one's having made a promise). And just as global requirements of rationality specify what one is rationally required to do in light of all of one's attitude-states, all-things-considered obligations specify what one is obligated to do in light of all the relevant features of one's situation. (For instance, despite having a *prima facie* obligation in place due to my having made a promise to you, I may be all-things-considered obligated to break that promise in light of other salient features of my situation -- perhaps I've made another more important promise that I can keep only by not keeping my promise to you.) If this analogy is apt, then a conflict of local rational requirements need be no more mysterious than a conflict of *prima facie* obligations.

It seems to me that the appeal to the *local* character of rational requirements provides an adequate resolution to the aforementioned objection to the Narrow-Scope interpretations of (I+) and (I-), but I won't have space to discuss this issue -- the issue of whether we should allow for the possibility of local rational requirements that cannot be jointly satisfied given a certain configuration of an agent's attitude-states -- in this paper.¹⁵ Rather I'll present a somewhat related objection to the Narrow-Scope interpretations of the four requirements Kolodny considers. The objection I'll present

¹⁴ See W. D. Ross *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), Ch.2.

¹⁵ See the exchange in J. Broome 'Wide or Narrow Scope?' and N. Kolodny, 'State or Process Requirements?' for further discussion of this and related issues. See especially §3 and §6 of Kolodny's paper.

concerns the case of an individual who, as in the case above, has put herself under *two* of Kolodny's (supposedly) Narrow-Scope rational requirements. Yet it is not a case of rational requirements that cannot be jointly satisfied -- the agent *can* comply with both requirements at the same time. It just seems very odd to say that *rationality requires her to do so*.

§2.

Let's suppose that someone -- call her Annie -- believes that she has conclusive reason to attend a lecture but does not intend to attend the lecture. She also, we'll suppose, believes that she lacks sufficient evidence for her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture. She faces two conflicts of attitude-states: a conflict (B-) governs (believing she lacks sufficient evidence for her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture and believing she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture) and a conflict (I+) governs (believing she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture and not intending to attend the lecture). If we read the requirements governing these conflicts as Narrow-Scope requirements, then we can detach from (B-NS) and (I+NS), respectively, two claims about what Annie is rationally required to do: 1) rationality requires her not to believe that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture, and, 2) rationality requires her to intend to attend the lecture.

These two requirements are not in conflict with one another. It is possible to satisfy both without betraying any irrationality: Annie could both drop her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture and form an intention to attend the lecture without being irrational in any way. (If she, in addition to dropping her belief that she

has conclusive reason to attend the lecture, were to form the belief that she *lacks sufficient* reason to attend the lecture, then she would be irrational in also forming an intention to attend the lecture. Doing so would put her under the conflict (I-) governs. But we're not dealing with that case here.) So, Annie's case is unlike the situation discussed above in which there are two rational requirements that cannot be jointly satisfied.

But, while there would be nothing *irrational* about Annie both dropping her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture and forming the intention to attend the lecture, I cannot see why we should say that she *is rationally required* to do each. Let's suppose that Annie drops her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture and also doesn't form the intention to attend the lecture -- a perfectly sensible thing for her to do. According to (I+NS), she has failed to do something that she was rationally required to do. To be clear, both Kolodny and I agree that she is in an irrational *state* when she believes that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture but does not intend to attend the lecture. And we are both concerned to specify what he calls 'process requirements' -- requirements which say 'how, going forward, one is to form, retain, or revise one's attitudes so as to escape or avoid such conflict states.'¹⁶ But if we interpret (B-) and (I+) as Narrow-Scope requirements, then we are committed to thinking *both* that Annie is rationally required to proceed by dropping her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture *and* that Annie is rationally required to proceed by coming to intend to attend the lecture. We are committed to thinking that when she proceeds by dropping her belief alone, she has proceeded *irrationally*.

¹⁶ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at p. 517.

It's true that by dropping her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture, Annie removes the condition which puts in place the consequent of (I+NS); once Annie drops her belief, it's no longer true that she is rationally required to intend to attend the lecture. But that doesn't change the fact that she failed to do what she was rationally required to do according to (I+NS). Before she dropped her belief, she was rationally required by (I+NS) to form the intention to attend the lecture and she failed to do this, and so she violated (I+NS). The same would go for Narrow-Scope conditionals employing the ordinary practical ought. Consider: 'If you have the life preserver, you ought to throw it to the man overboard.' Throwing the life preserver you have into the ship's furnace would remove the condition which puts in place the ought-claim in the consequent -- after throwing it in the furnace, it's no longer the case that you ought to throw it to the man overboard -- but it would also violate that ought-claim. You ought to have thrown it to the man overboard, not into the furnace.

Kolodny notes, correctly I think, that when someone like Annie abandons her belief about what she has conclusive reason to do because she thinks she lacks sufficient evidence for this belief, she is *rationally responding* to one conflict of attitude-states (the conflict (B-) governs), a side-effect of which is that she *removes herself* from another conflict of attitude-states (the conflict (I+) governs) to which she is not responding.¹⁷ But even though Annie is not rationally responding to the conflict (I+) governs, she is *in that conflict*, and, so long as she is in that conflict, (I+NS) *prescribes a specific way for her to proceed*: by forming the intention to attend the lecture. And this is precisely what is objectionable about (I+NS) in Annie's case.

¹⁷ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at p. 532.

In short, if the Narrow-Scope reading of (I+) is correct, then Annie fails to do something that she is rationally required to do when she abandons her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture without also forming an intention to attend the lecture. On (I+WS), in contrast, it's not the case that Annie fails to do something she is rationally required to do when she proceeds in this way. According to (I+WS), she is rationally required to *either* drop her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture *or* come to intend to attend the lecture. Since Annie drops her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture, she satisfies, and does not violate, (I+). For this reason, we should prefer (I+WS) over (I+NS) as an interpretation of (I+).

Similar Annie-type examples can be constructed to undermine the Narrow-Scope interpretations of (I-), (B+) and (B-) as well. Simply take the attitude specified in the antecedent of (I-NS), (B+NS), or (B-NS) and suppose that an agent believes that she has insufficient reason to have that attitude. This puts in place two Narrow-Scope requirements: the agent is rationally required to abandon the attitude in the antecedent and she is rationally required to come to have the attitude-state specified in the consequent; failing to do either of these things would be irrational. This, I think, is not what we want to say. What we want to say, and what the Wide-Scope interpretations of these requirements would say, is that there need not be any irrationality involved in abandoning the attitude in the antecedent without also coming to have the attitude-state specified in the consequent.

Could an appeal to the *local* character of rational requirements help save the Narrow-Scope view from the objection posed by the case of Annie? It is true that such an appeal helped save the Narrow-Scope view from the objection presented in §1 above.

There I noted that one could claim that the person who believes, inconsistently, both that he has conclusive reason to X and that he has insufficient reason to X faces two competing, local 'normative pressures': he feels some normative pressure to intend to X and some normative pressure not to intend to X. The requirements (I+NS) and (I-NS) give expression to these competing, local normative pressures. So, couldn't one also claim that, in the case of Annie, (I+NS) and (B-NS) give expression to *local* normative pressures: a local normative pressure to intend to attend the lecture (which is put in place by Annie's belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture) and a local normative pressure to abandon the belief that one has conclusive reason to attend the lecture (which is put in place by her belief that she lacks sufficient evidence for this belief)?

The appeal to the local character of rational requirements did help resolve the objection to the Narrow-Scope view considered in §1 above. That objection concerned the alleged implausibility of claiming both that one is rationally required to intend to X and that one is rationally required not to intend to X. By specifying that rational requirements are not *all-things-considered* requirements, but are instead *local* requirements, we thereby remove this implausibility. But the example of Annie points to *something else* implausible about the Narrow-Scope view, and this implausibility does not disappear once we specify that rational requirements are local requirements. What we find implausible about the example of Annie is the idea, to which the Narrow-Scope theorist is committed, that Annie could have done better (with respect to the applicable *local* rational requirements) had she *also* formed the intention to attend the lecture at the same time that she abandons her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the

lecture. But note that no similar implausibility is involved in the case considered in §1 above, where the agent who believes both that he has conclusive reason to X and that he has insufficient reason to X *could not* both intend to X and not intend to X. And so when he responds by, say, intending to X, it's not the case that he could have done better (with respect to the applicable local requirements). So, the implausible consequence shown by the example of Annie is not present in the case considered in §1. And the appeal to the *local* character of rational requirements does not help here. What we find implausible is that *with respect to the applicable local rational requirements*, Annie could have done better had she also formed the intention to attend the lecture.

Note also that this implausible consequence remains even if we accept Kolodny's innovative 'Transparency Account' of the requirements of rationality.¹⁸ According to the Transparency Account, roughly, rational requirements are not themselves genuinely normative, but they *appear* normative from the agent's point of view, or from the point of view of the agent's attitudes themselves. For instance, from the point of view of a person who believes that he has conclusive reason to X, or from the point of view of this belief itself, it *appears* that he ought to intend to X. But if it's not the case that he has conclusive reason to X, then it's not the case that he ought to intend to X. The requirements of rationality have only *apparent* normativity.

But what's implausible about the Narrow-Scope interpretation of rational requirements is the *conjunction* of claims it yields about what rationality requires of Annie: that rationality requires her to abandon her belief *and* rationality requires her to intend to attend the lecture. It's implausible to think that she has *violated some*

¹⁸ For further discussion of Kolodny's Transparency account, see S. Bridges, 'Rationality, Normativity and Transparency', *Mind* (forthcoming).

requirement of rationality when she abandons her belief without also coming to intend to attend the lecture. And this implausibility remains even on the Transparency Account. The conjunction of (apparently) normative claims is similarly implausible: that Annie *ought to* abandon her belief and she *ought to* intend to attend the lecture. It's implausible to think that she has done something she *ought not to have done* when she abandons her belief without also coming to intend to attend the lecture. *She* certainly wouldn't think she has done something she ought not to have done. So, even if we accept Kolodny's Transparency Account of rational requirements as having apparent normativity, the example of Annie provides us with good reason to reject the Narrow-Scope interpretation of (I+).

§3.

Let's review where the debate stands. The Narrow-Scope theorist wants to insist that Annie's belief that she has conclusive reason to go to the lecture puts in place a rational requirement to intend to attend the lecture. Since this rational requirement is 'local', it need not be withdrawn in the face of other, perhaps more important, competing rational requirements, such as a requirement not to intend to attend the lecture which is put in place by some other attitude of Annie's. In other words, the existence of this requirement is compatible with the existence of 'competing normative pressures.' But the objection I've developed here isn't helped by this qualification. The objection I'm making is that while a belief that one has conclusive reason to attend a lecture puts in place a rational requirement to intend to attend that lecture *in some* (indeed, many) *contexts*, it does not

do so *in all contexts*. Specifically, in the example above, it is absurd to say that Annie violated any requirement of rationality when she merely abandoned her belief.

The point made here is analogous to a point often made by Moral Particularists who appeal to *Holism about Reasons*. Moral Generalists typically understand moral principles, like 'Don't break your promises,' in one of two ways.¹⁹ On an 'absolutist' conception of 'Don't break your promises,' every instance of a broken promise would be an instance of wrongdoing; promise-breaking, regardless of the context, is always wrong. Alternatively, Generalists may understand moral principles as what Dancy has called 'contributory' principles. On this understanding of 'Don't break your promises,' it is possible to break a promise without wrongdoing. It might be that a certain instance of promise-breaking, while being worse insofar as it involves the breaking of a promise, has other features that speak in favor of it. And these features speaking in favor of it might make it such that, on balance, one ought to break one's promise in this case. Here, the fact that a certain action is an instance of promise-breaking will always speak against that action -- it always makes a 'contribution' against the performance of the action -- but the contribution may not suffice to make that action such that one ought not do it.

Particularists, however, find fault with both the 'absolutist' and 'contributory' conception of principles; both conceptions of principles, they argue, are threatened by Holism about Reasons. Holism about Reasons is the thesis that 'what is a reason is one case may be no reason in another, or even a reason on the other side.'²⁰ This thesis is

¹⁹ For an overview of the debate, see J. Dancy, 'Moral Particularism' in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, entry: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism>, and the collection of papers in B. W. Hooker and M. Little (eds.), *Moral Particularism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). I'll refer to Moral Particularism as 'Particularism' and Moral Generalism as 'Generalism' below.

²⁰ J. Dancy, *Ethics without Principles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 73. See also J. Dancy, *Moral Reasons* (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1993), pp. 60-108, and Shelly Kagan's related critique of the 'ubiquity thesis' in S. Kagan, 'The Additive Fallacy' *Ethics*, 99 (1988), pp. 5-31.

often defended by means of example. To take a standard example, that doing something will bring me pleasure is a reason for me to do it in some contexts but not in others, such as when that pleasure is sadistic. Consider also the following example from Jonathan Dancy:

...suppose it currently seems to me that something before me is red. Normally, one might say, that is a reason (*some* reason, that is, not necessarily sufficient reason) for me to believe that there is something red before me. But in a case where I also believe that I have recently taken a drug that makes blue things look red and red things look blue, the appearance of a red-looking thing before me is a reason for me to believe that there is a blue, not a red, thing before me. It is not as if it is some reason for me to believe that there is something red before me, but that as such a reason it is overwhelmed by contrary reasons. It is no longer *any reason at all* to believe that there is something red before me; indeed it is a reason for believing the opposite.²¹

Particularists argue that if reasons in general, including moral reasons, work holistically in this way -- that is, if a certain feature's status as a reason varies depending upon the other features present -- then we should be suspicious of moral principles on both the absolutist conception (according to which the presence of a certain feature always makes an action wrong) and the contributory conception (according to which the presence of a certain feature always makes a negative 'contribution').²²

²¹ J. Dancy, 'Moral Particularism', at §3. See also J. Dancy, *Ethics without Principles*, at p. 74.

²² Some Generalists have argued that the truth of Holism about Reasons need not pose a problem for Generalism. See, for instance, S. McKeever and M. Ridge, 'What does Holism have to do with Moral Particularism?', *Ratio*, 18 (2005), pp. 93-103, and P. Väyrynen, 'Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation', *Ethics*, 116 (2006), pp. 707-741.

The point I'm making with the example of Annie is analogous to the point Particularists make by appealing to Holism about Reasons. In Dancy's example of the person who took the drug, the fact that the object appears red to her is *no reason at all* for her to believe it is red; it's not that the object appearing red is *some* reason to believe it is red that is losing out in competition with *other* reasons not to believe that it is red. Likewise, in my example of Annie, it's not that her believing she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture puts in place *some* rational requirement to intend to attend the lecture that is losing out in competition with *another* rational requirement not to intend to attend the lecture put in place by some other attitude-states. (This is not a case of 'competing normative pressures' -- there *is no* requirement in place according to which Annie rationally ought not intend to attend the lecture.) Rather, the claim that she rationally ought to intend to attend the lecture is simply misplaced in this context. Dancy's example shows us that while one's seeing something as red may be a reason to believe it is red in *some contexts*, it's not a reason in *all contexts*, such as when one also believes that one has taken a color-reversal drug. In that case, the fact that it appears red is no reason at all to believe it is red. Likewise, the example of Annie shows us that while one's believing that one has conclusive reason to X puts in place a rational requirement to intend to X in *some contexts*, it does not do so in *all contexts*, such as when one also believes that one lacks sufficient evidence for the belief that one has conclusive reason to X. In that case, the fact that one believes one has conclusive reason to X puts in place no rational requirement at all to intend to X. The example of Annie establishes a thesis analogous to Holism about Reasons, one which we might term 'Holism about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements.' According to Holism about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements, an

attitude-state that puts in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement in one context need not put in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement in another context.

If we are Holists about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements, do we have to accept that *there are* Narrow-Scope rational requirements? In one sense we do, and in another sense we do not. First, let's consider the sense in which we do. Holists about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements concede that *in some contexts*, when one believes one has conclusive reason to X, there is a Narrow-Scope requirement to intend to X. For example, were Annie not to believe that she has insufficient evidence for her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture, then it would indeed be the case that rationality requires her to intend to attend the lecture. In this sense, Holists are happy to concede that there are Narrow-Scope requirements.

Indeed, those who defend the *Wide-Scope* interpretation of conditionals stating rational requirements are happy to concede the existence of Narrow-Scope requirements *in this sense*. Note that one traditional argument *for* using the Wide-Scope interpretation of conditionals stating rational requirements -- an argument distinct from the two arguments concerning detachment discussed in §1 above -- involves an appeal to *variability*. According to this argument, for any rational requirement governing a conflict of attitude-states A and B, it is possible for one's *other* attitude-states to line up to make it such that rationality requires one to drop A and it is also possible for one's *other* attitude-states to line up to make it such that rationality requires one to drop B. Suppose, for example, that I believe p , $p \rightarrow \sim q$ and q , assuming for simplicity that $p \rightarrow \sim q$ is a fixed background belief. It might be that I believe the evidence for p to be weak and the evidence for q to be quite strong, in which case rationality requires me to drop my belief

that p . Alternatively, I might believe the evidence for q to be weak and the evidence for p to be quite strong, in which case rationality requires me to drop my belief that q . And, given this variability, we should not read the conditional 'If one believes p , $p \rightarrow \sim q$, then rationality requires one to believe $\sim q$.' with 'rationality requires' as Narrow-Scoped; doing so would ignore the possibility of my other attitude-states lining up so as to require me to drop my belief that p instead. So, we should instead read the conditional with 'rationality requires' as Wide-Scoped. Some version of an argument along these lines has appeared in many discussions of the requirements of theoretical and practical rationality.²³ And a premise of the argument is that sometimes an agent's other attitude-states could line up so as to require a revision of some specific attitude-state. In this sense, the Wide-Scope theorist is happy to concede the existence of Narrow-Scope rational requirements.²⁴

But if we are Holists about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements, there is another sense in which we do not think there are Narrow-Scope rational requirements. Holists think, as I'll explain below, that all *conditionals* which state *local* rational requirements, if given a Narrow-Scope interpretation, can be shown to be false by Annie-type examples. In this sense, there are no Narrow-Scope rational requirements. (Remember that Kolodny and I are both concerned only with *local* rational requirements.) I'll first explain the

²³ For further examples of arguments roughly along these lines, see, in addition to works cited in note 1 above, C. Korsgaard, 'The Normativity of Instrumental Rationality' in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), *Ethics and Practical Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 215-254, at p. 237, and T. M. Scanlon, 'Reasons: A Puzzling Duality?' in P. Pettit, S. Scheffler and M. Smith (eds.), *Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 231-246, at pp. 234-235.

²⁴ Note that the existence of Narrow-Scope requirements in this sense is all that Kolodny needs for his 'bootstrapping argument' to be sound. If one is, in some cases, rationally required to drop one's belief that p , then if we accept the Reasons Claim (according to which, if one is rationally required to Z , then one has conclusive reason to Z) it would follow that, in those cases, one has conclusive reason to drop one's belief that p . And this is implausible bootstrapping. So, we should reject the Reasons Claim. So, the soundness of the bootstrapping argument does not depend on the soundness of the argument for the Narrow-Scope interpretations of (I+), (I-), (B+) and (B-). Thanks to Niko Kolodny for pointing this out to me.

importance of the fact that we are dealing with material conditionals, and then the importance of the fact that we are dealing with local rational requirements.

In Annie-type examples, the additional of another attitude (like Annie's belief that she has insufficient evidence for her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture) show conditionals like (I+NS) to be false. But why, one might ask, must we hold the Narrow-Scope interpretation of (I+) to such a high standard? Why must it be the case, for (I+NS) to be true, that one's believing one has conclusive reason to X puts in place a rational requirement to intend to X *regardless* of the other attitude-states one might have? To answer this question, we need to keep in mind that debate here is a debate about the *logical structure* of requirements of rationality. Narrow-Scope theorists hold that some rational requirements have the logical form, $p \rightarrow Oq$, where ' \rightarrow ' is the material conditional. The material conditional permits strengthening the antecedent; in other words, an argument of the following form is valid:

$p \rightarrow Oq$. Therefore, $p \& r \rightarrow Oq$.

So, we can infer from:

(I+NS) If one believes that there is conclusive reason to X, then rationality requires one to intend to X;

that:

(2) If one believes that there is conclusive reason to X *and* one believes there is insufficient evidence for this belief, rationality requires one to intend to X.

The example of Annie shows that (2) is false and, hence, it shows that (I+NS) is false.

The truth of (I+NS) *is not* challenged by the fact that an agent could have attitude-states along with the belief that he has conclusive reason to X that make it such that he is

also *rationally required not to intend to X*. (This would be a case of 'competing normative pressures.'). But the fact that an agent could have attitude-states along with the belief that he has conclusive reason to X that make it such that it's *not the case that he is rationally required to intend to X* does indeed show (I+NS) to be false.

Even though (I+NS) is false, there may be other true Narrow-Scope conditionals that can avoid Annie-type counterexamples. Consider the following amendment to (I+NS):

(I+NSv.2) If one *rationally* believes one has conclusive reason to X, rationality requires one to intend to X.

The example of Annie, while a counterexample to (I+NS) is no counterexample to (I+NSv.2) because Annie does not *rationally* believe she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture (since she also believes that she has insufficient evidence for this belief). The amended conditional, (I+NSv.2), is able to avoid Annie-type counterexamples because the clause '*rationally* believes' takes into account how one's *other* attitude-states -- that is, attitude-states other than the ones involved in the conflict between believing one has conclusive reason to X and not intending to X -- might line up. And when one's other attitude-states line up as Annie's do, the condition specified in the antecedent is not met, and so the requirement does not apply.

I do not want to deny that (I+NSv.2) and other, similarly structured, Narrow-Scoped conditionals are true. But I do think that all conditionals which state *local* rational requirements, if given a Narrow-Scope interpretation, will be shown to be false by Annie-type examples. (I+NSv.2), unlike (I+), is not a local rational requirement. Local requirements, as Kolodny puts it, 'are focused on specific conflicts among one's

attitudes.²⁵ For instance, as Kolodny argues, whenever one is in the conflict of believing one has conclusive reason to X and not intending to X, *regardless of the other attitude-states one has*, there is a local requirement -- namely (I+) -- in place governing this conflict, regardless of the other local requirements in place governing one's other conflicts. In order to determine whether (I+) is applicable, there is no need to look at any other attitude-states besides those involved in this conflict -- that is, besides one's believing one has conclusive reason to X and not intending to X. (This is true on both interpretations of (I+) we have considered, (I+NS) and (I+WS).) But (I+NSv.2) is different. It doesn't apply simply when one is in the conflict of believing one has conclusive reason to X and not intending to X -- one must also *rationally* believe that one has conclusive reason to X. So, in order to see whether (I+NSv.2) applies, we must look at the entire set of an agent's attitude-states to see whether there is any other attitude-state that would make that belief irrational. It is thus not a local rational requirement like (I+), (I-), (B+), and (B-), on either the Wide- or Narrow-Scope interpretations; for these requirements, one's *other* attitude-states are irrelevant to whether the requirement is in place.

The Holist about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements thinks that there are no Narrow-Scope rational requirements in the sense that any conditional which states a *local* rational requirement -- such as the four requirements that Kolodny considers, (I+), (I-), (B+) and (B-) -- if given a Narrow-Scope interpretation, can be shown to be false by Annie-type counterexamples. It is possible for one's other attitude-states to line up, as Annie's do, in a way which shows the antecedent to be true but the consequent false. But if the conditional is such that the antecedent takes into account attitude-states other than

²⁵ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at p. 516.

those involved in the local conflict, as (I+NSv.2) does, then Annie-type counterexamples can be avoided.

In summary, Holists about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements argue that an attitude-state that puts in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement in one context need not put in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement in another context. This is shown by the example of Annie: while one's believing that one has conclusive reason to attend the lecture may put in place a Narrow-Scope requirement to intend to attend the lecture in some contexts, it does not do so in all contexts, such as when one also believes, as Annie does, that one lacks sufficient evidence for one's belief. And Holists about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements think that all conditionals which state *local* rational requirements (like the four requirements Kolodny considers), if given a Narrow-Scope interpretation, can be shown to be false by Annie-type counterexamples.

§4.

I have been arguing against Kolodny's view that (I+) should be read as a Narrow-Scope requirement. But Kolodny also gives an argument for this view. We should consider this argument to see if we can find precisely where it goes astray. Kolodny first proposes a test to determine whether a rational requirement is Wide or Narrow-Scope:

Rational Response Test: Suppose it is claimed that the process-requirement governing the conflict between [attitude-states] A and B is wide scope: i.e., one is rationally required (either not to have A, or not to have B). For this claim to be

true, it must be the case that (i) one can rationally resolve the conflict of having A and B by dropping B and (ii) one can rationally resolve it by dropping A.²⁶

If one can rationally resolve the conflict of having A and B only by dropping B, then a Narrow-Scope requirement is in place. Some ways of resolving a conflict, like abandoning an intention due to an electric shock, are clearly not *rational* ways of resolving a conflict. So how are we to distinguish *rational* ways of resolving the conflict from *arbitrary* ways of resolving it? Kolodny suggests that rationally resolving a conflict must involve the subject's awareness of 'what is amiss' in the conflict, and his *reasoning* to a resolution of the conflict. And he goes on to provide a specific conception of reasoning as a process which *starts from the content* of one of the conflicting attitude-states, and leads to the revision of the other attitude-state. He provides an illustration:

Suppose, for example, the conflict consists in my believing that it is Monday and believing that it is Tuesday. If I rationally resolve this conflict by revising my belief that it is Tuesday, I do so by reasoning from the content of my belief that it is Monday – from the fact, or apparent fact, that it is Monday – to revising the belief that it is Tuesday.²⁷

With this conception of reasoning in hand, Kolodny goes on to re-state the Rational Response Test as the Reasoning Test:

Reasoning Test : The process requirement governing the conflict between A and B is wide-scope – that is one is rationally required (either not to have A, or not to have B) – only if, from a state in which one has conflicting attitudes A and B, (i)

²⁶ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at pp. 519-520.

²⁷ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at p. 520.

one can reason from the content of A to dropping B and (ii) one can reason from the content of B to dropping A.²⁸

If reasoning can flow only in one direction, then we cannot interpret that requirement as a Wide-Scope requirement, but must see it as a Narrow-Scope requirement instead.

So, to interpret (I+) as a Wide-Scope requirement, it must be the case that (i) one can reason from the content of one's belief that one has conclusive reason to X to the formation of an intention to X and (ii) one can reason from the content of one's not intending to X to an abandonment of the belief that one has conclusive reason to X. The 'downstream' reasoning required in (i) is unproblematic: one can start from the content of one's belief that one has conclusive reason to X -- the fact, or apparent fact, that one has conclusive reason to X -- and form the intention to X. But the 'upstream' reasoning required in (ii) is impossible since there is no content from which such reasoning could proceed. Attitudes have content, but the absence of an attitude does not have content:

One cannot reason from the content of one's not intending to X to anything at all, *because there is no such content*. Not intending to X is simply lacking an attitude. The *lack* of an attitude has no content. (Intending not to X does have content, namely, that one will not X. But intending *not* to X is not the same as *not* intending to X.)²⁹

Thus, Kolodny argues, since (I+) fails the Reasoning Test, (I+) is a Narrow-Scope requirement. Similar arguments employing the Reasoning Test are given for the Narrow-Scope interpretations of (I-), (B+) and (B-).³⁰

²⁸ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at pp. 520-521.

²⁹ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at p. 528.

³⁰ N. Kolodny, 'Why be Rational?', at pp. 527-528.

One might have some doubts about whether the Reasoning Test is a proper way of *re-stating* the Rational Response Test. As I noted at the outset of this paper, some conflicts of attitude-states are conflicts between the presence of one attitude and the presence of another, while others are conflicts between the presence of one attitude and the absence of another. But all of these latter class of conflicts will fail the Reasoning Test since there is no content in the *absence* of an attitude, and hence no place from which reasoning could proceed to the revision of the present attitude. Yet it does not seem as though the question of whether one can *rationally respond* to the conflict of attitude-states by revising a present attitude depends so much on whether the other attitude-state in the conflict is a present attitude or an absence of an attitude. Consider the following two conflicts of attitude-states: (C1) I believe that it's Monday, believe that if it's Monday, it's not Tuesday, and believe that it's Tuesday; and (C2) I believe that it's Monday, believe that if it's Monday, it's not Tuesday, and don't believe that it's not Tuesday. For simplicity, we'll assume the belief that if it's Monday, it's not Tuesday is a fixed background belief. (C1) and (C2) are very similar conflicts, especially from the point of view of the agent confronting and trying to resolve these conflicts. These conflicts would bring an agent to the same kind of inquiry -- perhaps leading him to look to a newspaper for the date, or prompting him to try to recall whether last night's television program was Sunday Night Football or Monday Night Football -- in order to resolve the conflict of attitude-states in which he finds himself. So, it seems, when it would be rational for an agent to resolve one of these conflicts by dropping the belief that it is Monday, it would also be rational for that agent to resolve the other conflict by dropping the belief that it is Monday were (other things remaining the same) he to be in

that conflict instead; it seems that (C1) and (C2) would be treated alike when it comes to the Rational Response Test. Yet, they are treated very *differently* when it comes to the Reasoning Test. The requirement governing (C1) will pass the Reasoning Test: I can reason from the content of my belief that it is Tuesday -- the fact, or apparent fact, that it is Tuesday -- to a revision of my belief that it is Monday, and *vice versa*. But the requirement governing (C2) will not pass the Reasoning Test since there is no content in my *not believing* it's not Tuesday. So, one might doubt whether the Reasoning Test is a proper way of *re-stating* the Rational Response Test.

But even if we were to accept the Reasoning Test as a proper way of re-stating the Rational Response Test, or we were to come up with some other way of further specifying the Rational Response Test, there is a more serious problem for Kolodny's argument. (It is a problem concerning his employment of *both* the Rational Response Test and the Reasoning Test.) Specifically, as I'll argue below, his argument for the Narrow-Scope interpretation of (I+) relies upon a hidden premise, which we might term 'Atomism about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements', according to which an attitude-state that puts in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement in one context *must* put in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement in another context. His argument is sound only if this premise is true. And, as I have been arguing, the example of Annie shows that it is not.

Both the Rational Response Test and the Reasoning Test, putting it roughly, involve a certain *narrowing* of an agent's focus. In order to run these tests, we need to imagine an agent focusing on two specific attitude-states, A and B, and the conflict between them, and *only on* those attitude-states and the conflict between them. Other

attitude-states and conflicts are, for the moment, left out of the picture. For instance, in applying the tests, we would consider the conflict between one's believing that one has conclusive reason to X and one's not intending to X *in abstraction from* any other attitude-states and conflicts the agent might have. In abstracting from other attitude-states in this way, it does seem right to conclude that there is only one way for an agent to rationally resolve the conflict (I+) governs: by intending to X. It seems right to conclude this because in cases in which there *are no* other attitude-states conflicting with one's belief that one has conclusive reason to X, one is rationally required to intend to X. (I+NSv.2) would apply. Here, one's believing that one has conclusive reason to X makes a difference to what one is rationally required to do: it makes it such that one is rationally required to intend to X.

But how can we infer from this that (I+NS) is true? According to (I+NS), *whenever* one believes that one has conclusive reason to X, rationality requires one to intend to X. Kolodny seems to be inferring from the fact that one's believing one has conclusive reason to X makes a difference *somewhere*, that it makes a difference *everywhere*.³¹ More precisely, he infers from the fact that one's believing that one has conclusive reason to X makes it such that rationality requires one to intend to X in the case in which there are no other attitude-states conflicting with one's belief that one has conclusive reason to X (the case that is imagined when employing the Rational Response Test and the Reasoning Test), that one's believing that one has conclusive reason to X *always* makes it such that rationality requires one to intend to X -- in other words, that (I+NS) is true. His argument assumes the truth of Atomism about Narrow-Scope

³¹ The phrasing here is borrowed from Kagan's formulation of the ubiquity thesis. See S. Kagan, 'The Additive Fallacy', at p. 12.

Rational Requirements. This thesis, I argued, is shown by the example of Annie to be false. And insofar as Kolodny's argument relies upon the thesis, the argument is unsound.

§5.

Holists about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements deny that conditionals stating local rational requirements can be interpreted as Narrow-Scope. We must instead interpret all such conditionals, including the four Kolodny considers, as Wide-Scope. But, as I mentioned in §3 above, there is a sense in which Holists about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements are not opposed to the existence of Narrow-Scope rational requirements: we concede that *in some contexts*, Annie's believing she has conclusive reason to intend to X does indeed put in place a (Narrow-Scope) rational requirement to intend to X. We just deny that it does so in *all contexts*. But why, one might ask, should we even concede that there are Narrow-Scope rational requirements in this sense? After all, if we think that all conditionals stating local requirements should be interpreted as having Wide-Scope, and these Wide-Scope local requirements hold in all contexts, is there any need to allow that there are Narrow-Scope rational requirements? Why not simply deny that there are any Narrow-Scope rational requirements *in any sense*?

The reason we cannot dispense with Narrow-Scope rational requirements entirely is that not all of our assessments about what an agent is rationally required to do are *local* assessments. Consider Annie once more. Annie does not intend to attend the lecture, but she believes she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture, and she believes she has insufficient evidence for this belief. There are two local requirements in place, (I+) and

(B-) and, as I have been arguing, we should read these as (I+WS) and (B-WS). But we are *also* inclined to look at Annie's attitude-states *as a whole*, and, taking all her attitude-states into account, say that she is rationally required to drop her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture (and that this is *all* that she is rationally required to do, and any *other* way of proceeding would be irrational in this case). Likewise, in the case where Annie *doesn't* believe that she has insufficient evidence for her belief that she has conclusive reason to attend the lecture, we are inclined to say that, looking at her attitude-states as a whole, she is rationally required to intend to attend the lecture. These Narrow-Scope claims are based on a holistic, global assessment of the agent's attitude-states. Although the Holist about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements thinks that conditionals stating *local* rational requirements, if given a Narrow-Scope interpretation, can be shown to be false by Annie-type examples, the Holist is not opposed to Narrow-Scope claims which take into account the whole of an agent's attitude-states. (Similarly, the *Holist about Reasons*, while skeptical of contributory principles -- that is, principles according to which the presence of a certain feature always makes a 'contribution' against (or in favor of) the performance of a certain action -- nonetheless thinks that we can make claims about what a certain agent ought to do, taking into account all the relevant features of his circumstances.)

Before concluding, we should note that one question remains unanswered for the view advanced in this paper: how are these global, Narrow-Scope claims about what rationality requires related to the local, Wide-Scope claims about what rationality requires? Could we somehow use the latter to explain the former? Could we perhaps start with the applicable, local Wide-Scope claims and, taking into account the agent's

other attitude-states in some way, arrive at a global, Narrow-Scope claim about what rationality requires of the agent? If so, how exactly would such an explanation go? And, if no such explanation is available, should we then be concerned about the mysterious, brutish nature of these Narrow-Scope claims? I confess to having no well-worked-out answer to address these further concerns, and hesitate to speculate here about how they should be addressed.

So, let's end by summing up the main conclusions reached in this paper. I have here argued against the Narrow-Scope interpretations of (I+), (I-), (B+) and (B-). Against (I+NS), I presented an example (Annie) where it is true that one believes that one has conclusive reason to X, but one would display no irrationality in not intending to X. Kolodny's *argument* for (I+NS) as an interpretation of (I+) rests on the assumption, which I call 'Atomism about Narrow-Scope Rational Requirements', that an attitude-state that puts in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement in one context must put in place a Narrow-Scope rational requirement in another context. This assumption explains why he thinks that we can infer from the fact that (I+) fails the Reasoning Test that (I+NS) -- according to which, *whenever* one believes that one has conclusive reason to X, rationality requires one to intend to X -- is true. This assumption, I argued, is false, and since Kolodny's argument relies on it, the argument is unsound.³²

University of Missouri, St. Louis

³² Many thanks to Eric Wiland, Robert Northcott and especially Niko Kolodny for helpful written comments and discussions. The paper was also helped a great deal by two anonymous *Philosophical Quarterly* referees who provided insightful, detailed, and constructive comments. Work on this paper was supported by a University of Missouri Research Board Award.